Publications
Domestic political use of force is a strategy for political leaders to divert the public’s attention away from economic instability and rebuild political capital. But, diversionary incentives are not the only motivation; the targeted vulnerable minority’s capabilities are important. We analyze how the combination of diversionary incentive and out-group mobilization capabilities influences leaders’ decision-calculus. Embattled leaders make strategic decisions about both the target and the adequate severity of force to accomplish diversion without risking conflict escalation. We empirically test the resulting hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset from 1998 to 2003 and find support for our expectations. Incentive alone does not determine domestic political use of force; the same incentive produces variance in the severity of force dependent on the targeted out-group’s mobilization capability. Governments match the severity of domestic force to political survival goals and the costs and risks of political use of force.
Why does one terror group employ actions that win the hearts and minds of its constituency while another resorts to tactics that alienates their support? The paper investigates terror groups’ strategy of building reputation in their constituency and out-group. Studying all domestic terror groups between 1980 and 2011 with original data, we find that ethnic/religious groups and those with territorial control invest in positive reputation in their constituency, the people the groups claim to represent, as they can minimize the risks of returns. Radical groups and those with cross-border support however tend to build negative constituency reputation. Lastly, we find that terror groups seeking policy concessions avoid building a negative reputation in their out-group, the people outside their constituency, in order to enhance their chances of negotiating with the government.
The diversionary theory largely focuses on the incentives leaders have to use force. However, little attention has been given to the characteristics that make for a good target. We argue that US presidents choose targets that repress human rights since they are the easiest to sell to international and domestic audiences. By targeting repressive states US presidents can justify their use of force by cloaking their motivation in the language of human rights, responding to calls for intervention, pointing to the failure of international actors and institutions to resolve these problems, and building upon emerging norms that allow for intervention in repressive states. Updating US Use of Force data, we empirically test and find support for our hypothesis that presidents target human rights abusers when they face trouble at home. This paper contributes to target selection process by offering a complete theory of diversionary conflict accounting for cost/benefit calculation of presidents. Moreover, we believe that our findings reveal human rights practices’ role in international conflict, as well.
As a foreign policy tool implemented with the purpose of fostering both hard and soft power, the provision of foreign aid on the part of the U.S. has the potential to further U.S. interests. Yet, previous research has not probed the effects of U.S. foreign aid on public attitudes toward the U.S. in the recipient countries. In this paper, I argue that U.S. foreign aid may actually feed anti-Americanism: aid indirectly creates winners and losers in the recipient countries, such that politically discontented people may blame the U.S. for the survival of the prevailing regime. Drawing on Pew Research for Global Attitudes and on USAID Greenbook datasets, I focus on determining both the conditions under which foreign aid exacerbates anti-Americanism and the type of aid most likely to do this. The findings reveal that political losers of the recipient countries are more likely to express negative attitudes toward the U.S. as the amount of U.S. aid increases, whereas political winners enjoy the results of U.S. aid and view the U.S. positively accordingly. Moreover, the effect of U.S. aid on attitudes toward the U.S. is also conditional on the regime type. While U.S. aid increases the likelihood of anti-American attitudes among the losers in non-democratic countries, it decreases the likelihood of anti-Americanism among the losers in democratic ones. This research has important implications for policy in terms of determining how and to whom to provide aid in the context of the possible ramifications of providing aid at the individual level.
Violence against civilians is not the only tool among the arsenal of terrorists; it is only one of many. Up until now, there did not exist any quantitative data on the different strategies adopted by terror groups that measured the group’s popularity or its public support. Reputation of Terror Groups (RTG) dataset addresses this void. To understand which terror groups build different types of reputation, to analyze the consequences of reputation building and how reputation changes with and influences conflict dynamics, we need to be able to measure the loaded concept of reputation. RTG is the first systematic measure for the reputation of terror groups across countries or time. The dataset includes 443 terror groups operating across 31 years, which makes a total of 2641 observations. Large sample size of RTG dataset allows comparisons of popularity among groups. Additionally, the dataset also adopts a multi-variable approach by examining multiple aspects of both positive and negative reputation building. Another novelty of the data is its measure of reputation with regard to each target, mainly its constituency and target audience. RTG data can help us come up with new and novel ways of understanding terror groups, and contribute to bridging the gap between micro and mezzo level studies in the literature by showing how terror groups’ adopt different strategies in their constituency and target audience to pursue their goals. In this article, we give an overview assessment of RTG dataset, display some interesting trends in the data, and explain the data collection procedure, its challenges, as well as its limitations.
Examining justice-level determinants of party dissolution decisions can reveal how high Courts may influence the public choice by constraining the representation of political ideologies. We argue that Constitutional Court justices strategically engage in politics through party dissolution cases, and justices `en garde' act to guard the regime against anti-establishment ideologies. As a graveyard of political parties, Turkey is an appropriate case to study this claim. By introducing a unique dataset, we demonstrate that communist, religious and ethnic parties in Turkey with considerable public support are more likely to be dissolved by justices having an activist and pro-status quo ideological stance.
The literature largely neglects whether individual politicians or political parties in proportional representation enjoy a similar incumbency advantage to the established democracies with SMD. We suggest that institutional settings provide incentives for political parties to field incumbent candidates strategically, depending on district size; and high levels of party system instability in consolidating democracies create conditions under which political parties benefit more from the incumbents' reputations. By using a new dataset, we test whether the incumbency advantage exists, and depends on the district size and the level of political instability in Turkey. Our results indicate that the incumbency advantage in Turkey is largely conditional on the district size. The effect of the party system instability is also substantial. The higher the party system instability, the more political parties benefit from fielding incumbents in party lists.
- Klein, Graig R., and Efe Tokdemir. n.d. Domestic diversion: Selective targeting of minority out-groups. forthcoming at Conflict Management and Peace Science. DOI: 10.1177/0738894216658675
Domestic political use of force is a strategy for political leaders to divert the public’s attention away from economic instability and rebuild political capital. But, diversionary incentives are not the only motivation; the targeted vulnerable minority’s capabilities are important. We analyze how the combination of diversionary incentive and out-group mobilization capabilities influences leaders’ decision-calculus. Embattled leaders make strategic decisions about both the target and the adequate severity of force to accomplish diversion without risking conflict escalation. We empirically test the resulting hypotheses using the Minorities at Risk dataset from 1998 to 2003 and find support for our expectations. Incentive alone does not determine domestic political use of force; the same incentive produces variance in the severity of force dependent on the targeted out-group’s mobilization capability. Governments match the severity of domestic force to political survival goals and the costs and risks of political use of force.
- Akcinaroglu, Seden, and Efe Tokdemir. n.d. To Instill Fear or Love: Terror Groups and Strategy of Building Reputation. forthcoming at Conflict Management and Peace Science. DOI: 10.1177/0738894216634292
Why does one terror group employ actions that win the hearts and minds of its constituency while another resorts to tactics that alienates their support? The paper investigates terror groups’ strategy of building reputation in their constituency and out-group. Studying all domestic terror groups between 1980 and 2011 with original data, we find that ethnic/religious groups and those with territorial control invest in positive reputation in their constituency, the people the groups claim to represent, as they can minimize the risks of returns. Radical groups and those with cross-border support however tend to build negative constituency reputation. Lastly, we find that terror groups seeking policy concessions avoid building a negative reputation in their out-group, the people outside their constituency, in order to enhance their chances of negotiating with the government.
- Tokdemir, Efe. and Brendan S. Mark. 2018. When Killers become victims: Diversionary War, Human Rights, and Strategic Target Selection. International Interactions 44(2): 337-360.
The diversionary theory largely focuses on the incentives leaders have to use force. However, little attention has been given to the characteristics that make for a good target. We argue that US presidents choose targets that repress human rights since they are the easiest to sell to international and domestic audiences. By targeting repressive states US presidents can justify their use of force by cloaking their motivation in the language of human rights, responding to calls for intervention, pointing to the failure of international actors and institutions to resolve these problems, and building upon emerging norms that allow for intervention in repressive states. Updating US Use of Force data, we empirically test and find support for our hypothesis that presidents target human rights abusers when they face trouble at home. This paper contributes to target selection process by offering a complete theory of diversionary conflict accounting for cost/benefit calculation of presidents. Moreover, we believe that our findings reveal human rights practices’ role in international conflict, as well.
- Tokdemir, Efe. 2017. Winning hearts and minds (!): The dilemma of foreign aid in anti-Americanism. Journal of Peace Research 54(6): 819-832
As a foreign policy tool implemented with the purpose of fostering both hard and soft power, the provision of foreign aid on the part of the U.S. has the potential to further U.S. interests. Yet, previous research has not probed the effects of U.S. foreign aid on public attitudes toward the U.S. in the recipient countries. In this paper, I argue that U.S. foreign aid may actually feed anti-Americanism: aid indirectly creates winners and losers in the recipient countries, such that politically discontented people may blame the U.S. for the survival of the prevailing regime. Drawing on Pew Research for Global Attitudes and on USAID Greenbook datasets, I focus on determining both the conditions under which foreign aid exacerbates anti-Americanism and the type of aid most likely to do this. The findings reveal that political losers of the recipient countries are more likely to express negative attitudes toward the U.S. as the amount of U.S. aid increases, whereas political winners enjoy the results of U.S. aid and view the U.S. positively accordingly. Moreover, the effect of U.S. aid on attitudes toward the U.S. is also conditional on the regime type. While U.S. aid increases the likelihood of anti-American attitudes among the losers in non-democratic countries, it decreases the likelihood of anti-Americanism among the losers in democratic ones. This research has important implications for policy in terms of determining how and to whom to provide aid in the context of the possible ramifications of providing aid at the individual level.
- Tokdemir, Efe, and Seden Akcinaroglu. 2016. Reputation of Terror Groups Dataset: Measuring Popularity of Terror Groups. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 53(2) 268-277.
Violence against civilians is not the only tool among the arsenal of terrorists; it is only one of many. Up until now, there did not exist any quantitative data on the different strategies adopted by terror groups that measured the group’s popularity or its public support. Reputation of Terror Groups (RTG) dataset addresses this void. To understand which terror groups build different types of reputation, to analyze the consequences of reputation building and how reputation changes with and influences conflict dynamics, we need to be able to measure the loaded concept of reputation. RTG is the first systematic measure for the reputation of terror groups across countries or time. The dataset includes 443 terror groups operating across 31 years, which makes a total of 2641 observations. Large sample size of RTG dataset allows comparisons of popularity among groups. Additionally, the dataset also adopts a multi-variable approach by examining multiple aspects of both positive and negative reputation building. Another novelty of the data is its measure of reputation with regard to each target, mainly its constituency and target audience. RTG data can help us come up with new and novel ways of understanding terror groups, and contribute to bridging the gap between micro and mezzo level studies in the literature by showing how terror groups’ adopt different strategies in their constituency and target audience to pursue their goals. In this article, we give an overview assessment of RTG dataset, display some interesting trends in the data, and explain the data collection procedure, its challenges, as well as its limitations.
- Moral, Mert, and Efe Tokdemir. 2017. Justices 'en Garde': Ideological Determinants of the Dissolution of Anti-Establishment Parties. International Political Science Review, Vol. 38(3): 264-280
Examining justice-level determinants of party dissolution decisions can reveal how high Courts may influence the public choice by constraining the representation of political ideologies. We argue that Constitutional Court justices strategically engage in politics through party dissolution cases, and justices `en garde' act to guard the regime against anti-establishment ideologies. As a graveyard of political parties, Turkey is an appropriate case to study this claim. By introducing a unique dataset, we demonstrate that communist, religious and ethnic parties in Turkey with considerable public support are more likely to be dissolved by justices having an activist and pro-status quo ideological stance.
- Moral, Mert, H. Ege Ozen, and Efe Tokdemir. 2015. Bringing the Incumbency Advantage into Question for Proportional Representation. Electoral Studies (40): 56-65.
The literature largely neglects whether individual politicians or political parties in proportional representation enjoy a similar incumbency advantage to the established democracies with SMD. We suggest that institutional settings provide incentives for political parties to field incumbent candidates strategically, depending on district size; and high levels of party system instability in consolidating democracies create conditions under which political parties benefit more from the incumbents' reputations. By using a new dataset, we test whether the incumbency advantage exists, and depends on the district size and the level of political instability in Turkey. Our results indicate that the incumbency advantage in Turkey is largely conditional on the district size. The effect of the party system instability is also substantial. The higher the party system instability, the more political parties benefit from fielding incumbents in party lists.