

Appendix:

A - List of Terror Groups Included into RTG Dataset

1 May Group	Armed Falange	Communist Anti-Nuclear Front
16 January Organization for the Liberation of Tripoli	Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	Communist Combattant Cells (CCC) (Belgium)
2 April Group	Armed Group for the Liberation of Guadeloupe (GLAG)	Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)
20 December Movement (M-20)	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Communist Party of India- Marxist-Leninist
31 January People's Front (FP-31)	Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR)	Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist (CPN-M)
Abdullah Azzam Brigades	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	Conscientious Arsonists (CA)
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades	Army of God	Conspiracy of Cells of Fire
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)	Aryan Nation	Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Aryan Republican Army	Contras
Action Directe	Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq	Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)
Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA)	Athens and Thessaloniki Arsonist Nuclei	Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel
Africa Marine Commando	Aum Shinri Kyo	Cyprus Turkish People's Movement
African National Congress (South Africa)	Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA)	Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)	Autonomy (Italy)	Death to Bazuqueros
Al Jihad	Awami League	Death to Kidnappers (MAS)
Al Zulfiqar	Azania People's Organization (AZAPO)	Deccan Mujahideen
Al-Adl Wal Ihsane	Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Al-Fatah	Baloch Liberation Front (BLF)	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)	Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE)
Al-Itihaad al-Islami (AIAI)	Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	Democratic Revolutionary Party
Al-Mansoorian	Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	Dev Sol
Al-Qa'ida in Saudi Arabia	Bangladesh Sarbahara Party	Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C)
Al-Qa'ida in Yemen	Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)
Al-Qa'ida	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Dishmish Regiment
Al-Qa'ida in Iraq	Beirut Martyrs Battalion	Diyala Salvation Council
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTHK)	Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM)	Black Hand (Colombia)	Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
Al-Shabaab	Black Panther Group (Palestinian)	Ein Tyrol (One Tyrol)
Al-Umar Mujahideen	Black September II	Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
Albanian National Army (ANA)	Black Star	Eva Peron Organization
Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)	Black Widows	Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy
Alfaro Vive	Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)	Ex-Somoza National Guard
All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF)	Boko Haram	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)	Bolivian Socialist Falange	Fatah Hawks
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)	February 28 Popular League (El Salvador)
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	Breton Liberation Front (FLB)	February 9 Group
Amal	Brunswijk Jungle Commando	Fedayeen Khalq (People's Commandos)
America Battalion	CCCCC	Fighting Guerrilla Formation
Americans for a Competent Federal Judicial System	Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)	First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)	Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC)	Force 17
Ansar al-Islam	Caucasus Emirate	Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD)
Ansar al-Sunna	Che Guevara Brigade	Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
Anti-Authority Group (Greece)	Che Guevara Guerrillas	Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army
Anti-Communist Commando of the South	Chilean Anti-Communist Alliance (ACHA)	Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka)
Anti-State Justice	Chukakuha (Middle Core Faction)	Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners
Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL)	Cinchoneros Popular Liberation Movement	Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)
April 6th Liberation Movement	Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy
Arab Revolution/Liberation Vanguard Organization	Colonel Karuna Faction	Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN)
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN)	Com. of Solidarity with Arab and M.East Pol. Prisoners	Garo National Liberation Army

Gracchus Babeuf	Jharkhand Liberation Tigers (JLT)	May 19 Communist Order
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad	Mayi Mayi
Grey Wolves	Jundallah	Meibion Glyndwr
Guadeloupe Liberation Army	Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide	Misurasata Indian Organization
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	Mohajir National Movement
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)	Kach	Montoneros Patria Libre
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)	Kachin Independence Army (KIA)	Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH)
Guerrilla Forces for Liberation	Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front	Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF)	Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
Haqqani Network	Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF)	Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
Harkat ul Ansar	Karbi People's Liberation Tigers (KPLT)	Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	Karen National Union	Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Chile)
Hekla Reception Com.-Init. for More Social Eruptions	Kenya African National Union (KANU)	Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) (Peru)
Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan	Keshet	Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)
Hizb-I-Islami	Khalistan Commando Force	Mujahedeen Shura Council
Hizballah	Khalistan Liberation Force	Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	Khmer Rouge	Mujahideen Kashmir
Hizbul al Islam (Somalia)	King Street	Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)
Holy Spirit Movement	Kisan Indian Organization	Muslim Brotherhood
Illuminating Paths of Solidarity	Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)
Indian Mujahideen	Ku Klux Klan	National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP)
Indipendenza	Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)
Informal Anarchist Federation	Kurdistan Free Life Party	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	National Front for the Salvation of Libya
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)
Iparretarrak (IK)	Landless Peasants' Movement (MST)	National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN)
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)	National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Islambouli Brigades of al-Qa'ida	Laskar Jihad	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
Islamic Army in Iraq (al-Jaish al-Islami fi al-Iraq)	Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)	Nat. Soc. Council of Nagaland-IsakMuivah (NSCN-IM)
Islamic Courts Union (ICU)	Lebanese Liberation Front	Nat. Soc. Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)	Lebanese National Resistance Front	Nat. Union for the Total Ind. of Angola (UNITA)
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA)	Naxalites
Jaime Bateman Cayon Group (JBC)	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	New Armenian Resistance
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy	New People's Army (NPA)
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)
Jamaat-E-Islami (Bangladesh)	Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary Front (LZRF)	Ninjas
Jamaat-E-Islami (India/Pakistan)	Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)	Ninth of June Organization
Jamaat-al-Fuqra	M-19 (Movement of April 19)	November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO)
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)	Macheteros	November 21 Organization
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front	Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT)	OAS-MRP
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)	Mahdi Army	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Goit (JTMM-G)	Manuel Jose Arce Commando	Oglaigh na hEireann
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Jwala Singh (JTMM-J)	Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)	Omega-7
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- Rajan Mukti (JTMM-R)	Maoist Communist Center (MCC)	Orange Volunteers (OV)
Janjaweed	Maximiliano Gomez Revolutionary Brigade	Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade	Orly Organization
Jewish Defense League (JDL)	May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine	Oromo Liberation Front

Pakistani People's Party (PPP)	Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	Taliban
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	Reform of the Armed Forces Movement	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	Resistenza	Tanzim
Palestinian Revolution Forces	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)	Tawhid and Jihad
Party for the Liberation of Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Nicaragua (FARN)	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty)	Revolutionary Front for National Liberation	Teraí Army
Patriotic Liberation Front	Rev. Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)	Terra Lliure
Patriotic Morazanista Front (FPM)	Revolutionary Nuclei	Terror Against Terror
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA)	The Extraditables
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems	The Justice Department
Peasant Self-Defense Group (ACCU)	Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA)	The Order (Silent Brotherhood)
Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces	Revolutionary Popular Left	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)	Revolutionary Struggle	Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)
People's Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA)	Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	Tritiya Prastuti Committee (India)
People's Fatherland Movement	Revolutionary Workers Party	Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
People's Liberation Army (India)	Revolutionary Workers' Council (Kakurokyo)	Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)
People's Liberation Front (JVP)	Ricardo Franco Front (Dissident FARC)	Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)
People's Liberation Front of India	Right-Wing Death Squad	Turkish Hizballah
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	Riyadus-Salikhin Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	Turkish People's Liberation Army
People's Revolutionary Command (CRP)	Rodrigo Franco Command	Turkish People's Liberation Front (TPLF)(THKP-C)
People's Revolutionary Organization	Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)	Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM)
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)	Uganda People's Army
People's United Liberation Front (PULF)	Salafia Jihadia	Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)
People's War Group (PWG)	Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)	Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Polisario Front	Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)	United Freedom Front (UFF)
Popular Forces of April 25	Sandinistas	United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship
Popular Front for Justice in the Congo	Scottish National Liberation Army	United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)	United Liberation Torchbearers Forces
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)	Senki ("Battle Flag")	United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
Popular Liberation Resistance Force	September 11 Commandos	United Nicaraguan Opposition
Popular Militia (Colombia)	Shan United Revolutionary Army	United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	Shanti Bahini - Peace Force	United Popular Action Front (FAPU)
Popular Resistance Committees	Shaykh Subhi Al-Salih Forces	United Popular Action Movement
Popular Revolutionary Army (Mexico)	Shining Path (SL)	United Self Defense Units of Colombia (AUC)
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)	Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB)	Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
Prima Linea	Sindhu Desh Liberation Army (SDLA)	White Wolves
Puerto Rican Armed Resistance	Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)	Workers Brigade for Communism
Punitive Leftist Front	Soldiers of Truth	Workers' Self-Defense Movement (MAO)
Purbo Banglar Communist Party	Somali National Movement	World Church of the Creator
Quintín Lame	Somali Salvation Front (SSF)	Young Communist League
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)	South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)	Zapatista National Liberation Army
Ranbir Sena	Southern Mobility Movement (Yemen)	Zarate Willka Armed Forces of Liberation
Raul Ernesto Cruz Leon, Salvadorian	Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)	Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union (ZANU)
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)	
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)	Sudan Liberation Movement	
Recontras	Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	
Red Army Faction (RAF)	Sudanese People's Liberation Forces	
Red Brigades	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)	
Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC)	Survivors of Golfech	
Red Flag (Venezuela)	Syrian Social Nationalist Party	

B-Data Sources

We collected data from newspaper databases such as Lexis and Nexis, Proquest, online articles and books. In addition we used START by University of Maryland, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC), Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Think Security Africa (TSA), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of The World by Szajkowski (2004) for coding public good provision, forced funding, forced recruitment, and media ownership; The UN Refugee Agency (RefWorld) for child recruitment, appendix of Political Parties and Terrorist Groups by Weinberg et al. (2009) for political affiliation.

C – Distinguishing Between Target Audience and Constituency:

To code reputation, first we distinguish between constituency and target audience of each group. The task is simple for ethno-terrorist organizations where ethnic identities demarcate clear boundaries. Identification is much harder for ideological groups however. What is the level of aggregation at which we stop? For example, take a leftist terror group such as the Communist party of India (Maoist). Does the group represent just Maoists or all leftists? Similarly, whom does Abu Sayyaf in Philippines represent? Is it all Muslims or just radical Muslims? We make several assumptions to identify the constituency of each group. First, we assume that domestic terror groups have a constituency and target audience in each country, that is, they have an aggrieved population they claim to fight for against one that is economically, politically or culturally favored by the government. Second, we assume that there is a clear ethnic/religious or ideological divide between the constituency and target audience that pits one against the other. Given these criteria, we resolve the aggregation issue by taking the most inclusive identity for constituency that still renders collective identities meaningful. Abu Sayyaf (ASG) for example fights for a sharia system in Philippines in a predominantly Christian country. While its ideology is radical, and may be unappealing to all the Muslims, we pick Muslims as the constituency of ASG rather than just the radical Muslims. This is because Christianity-Muslim divide is conflictual in the country, and creates meaningful identities at a higher aggregate level than the radical-moderate Muslim divide. Similarly, for Communist party of India (Maoist), we claim they represent the leftists rather than just the Maoists. Once we identify the constituency of each group, we code their reputation as given below.

D – Weighted Scale:

While we simply use an additive scale for each type of reputation, some researchers may find it theoretically justified using a weighted scale. Lyall et.al. (2013) in his study of Taliban violence in Afghanistan claims negative actions undertaken by in-group members are likely to be downplayed by the constituency as opposed to those inflicted by out-group members. This is not likely to be a problem for us as we measure negative constituency reputation by actions always inflicted by in-group members, terror groups claiming to represent them because they share the same ethnicity, religion or ideology. For example, PKK's actions towards the Kurds, Boko Haram's actions towards the Muslims or Communist Party of India's actions towards the leftists should all be perceived in the same light, as they are all carried out by in-group members. Similarly, we measure target audience reputation with actions carried out only by out-group members, terror groups not claiming to represent them because of ethnic, religious or ideological divide. Thus, our measures of constituency and target audience reputation are consistent across terror groups. However, it is possible that the type of cleavage may matter in measuring target audience reputation. For example, negative actions of out-group members belonging to different ethnic and/or religious identities may weigh more heavily on the public than the actions of terror groups with similar ideological affiliations. This is because ethnic or religious identities are often perceived to be more emotional and binding. We have coded the type of cleavage that separates the target audience of each terror group from their constituency. This variable can be used to create a weighted scale that takes into account the type of the cleavage. A second concern relates to the stickiness of reputation. By using an additive index, we assume that every time the group reduces its negative actions and instead employs positive ones, this should automatically result in an improved constituency score. However, some may claim that negative reputation is sticky, that is, newly employed positive actions, at least initially, may fail to shift the

constituency's negative opinion of the group. The change in opinion may come only after the constituents perceive new actions to be consistent and credible. We do not believe this to be a major problem with our measure first because our data shows that most terror groups undertake a set of positive or negative actions quite consistently. Second, we code the intent to build reputation by coding group actions, but short of looking at survey data, we are unable to measure how individuals perceive such actions. Hence we do not know when or the extent to which these actions create a sticky reputation. However, scholars can easily generate new variables in RTG dataset such as "change" or "duration" of positive/negative actions to create a weighted scale that emphasizes stickiness of reputation.

E – Validity of Indicators

Table I: Prevalent Indicators of Reputation in the Literature

Positive Constituency Reputation	
Public Goods Provision	Mishal and Sela, 2000; Chandrakanthan, 2000; Alexander, 2002; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Berman, 2004; Levitt, 2007; Berman and Laitin, 2008; Flanigan, 2008
Media Ownership	Weinberg and Eubank, 1987; Hudson, 1999; Stern, 2003; Caglar, 2006; Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006; Pekgozlu et. al 2007; Paul, 2009; Neumann and Smith, 2010;
Politics	Della Porta, 1988; Weinberg, 1991; Neumann and Smith, 2005
Negative Constituency Reputation	
Coercive Recruitment	Weinstein, 2007; Eck, 2014
Child Recruitment	Weinstein, 2007; Eck, 2014
Coercive Funding	Weinstein, 2007; Freeman, 2011
Target Audience Reputation	
Extreme Violence	Post, 1990; Glover, 1991; Abrahams, 2006; Cronin, 2009
Child Targeting	Silke, 2005; Dorn and Dorn, 2005; Johnston, 2009; Bradford and Wilson, 2013 and 2015

F – More Trends in the Data:

Our data indicates that a lot of the groups employ more than one action in each dimension of reputation building (Table II). For example 116 groups in our data have employed at least two actions that led to positive/negative reputation building. This confirms the validity of adopting a multi-variable approach in measuring each dimension. Looking in detail at the lower level category in Table II reveals an interesting pattern; most groups have engaged in politics, and employed coercive funding. This is not surprising, as political affiliation seems to be the least costly action a group can employ in its constituency to build a positive reputation. Others, such as public goods provision or media ownership, are costly endeavors and may require long-term planning that may be beyond the capacity of many groups. Similarly, some type of extortion may be quite prevalent among terror groups seeking resources, but fewer groups may seek coercive recruitment as it may bring monitoring costs and problems of defection, all of which may affect the success of the group.

Table II: Disaggregating Positive and Negative Constituency Reputation

Categories	Positive Constituency Reputation	Total	Negative Constituency Reputation	Total
0	Politics (0) Media (0) Public Good (0)	719	Forced Recruitment (0) Forced Funding (0) Child Recruitment (0)	939
1	Politics (1) = 690 Media (1) = 80 Public Good (1) = 83	880	Forced Recruitment (1) = 21 Child Recruitment (1) = 250 Forced Funding (1) = 408	680
2	Politics (1) + Media (1) = 181 Politics (1) + Public Good (1) = 412 Public Good (1) + Media (1) = 27	605	Forced Funding (1) + Forced Recruitment (1) = 19 Forced Funding (1) + Child Recruitment (1) = 436 Forced Recruitment (1) + Child Recruitment (1) = 80	535
3	Politics (1) + Media (1) + Public Good (1)	449	Forced Recruitment (1) + Forced Funding (1) + Child Recruitment (1)	488

G – Further Explanations on the Models in Tables III-IV:

Aside from the variables we introduced in the text, we also updated and used *peak size*, and group type (i.e. *religious*, *leftist*, *ethno-nationalist*) from Jones and Libicki (2008). We coded *competition*, the number of groups operating in a country-year. *Rebel* is a binary variable coded 1 if the terror group is also listed as a rebel group in UCDP dataset. We recoded *goal* from Jones and Libicki (2008) as 1 when goals were broad (e.g. empire and social revolution), 0 otherwise. We controlled for *cross-border* operations, as some domestic terrorists may also be active across the border. Such groups may have more options to find resources and fewer incentives to develop close constituency ties. At the country level, we control for *polity* (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), logged *GDP per capita*, *population* (UN Statistics Division) and *military personnel*.

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